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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
l/EYO CONCRETE PRODUCTS 1 INC., 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, Supreme Court No. 19272 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,: 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a worker's compensation case involving Second 
lnJury Fund. The issues in this case involve: first, the proper 
construction of Section 35-1-69, U.C.A.; second, whether the 
Administrative Law Judge committed error in discounting the appli-
cant's pre-existing conditions; and third, what effect, if any, 
<> Statement and Request agreement between State Insurance Fund 
and the applicant has regarding State Insurance Fund's right 
to reimbursement from Second Injury Fund. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A hearing was held September 20, 1982, in St. George, 
Urati, before an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission 
''n an application of Frederick J. Paulus for worker's compensation 
benefits for an industrial injury which occurred on August 12, 
1978. (R, 24) Applicant Paulus claimed benefits based on iniur•v 
he sustained to his back and shoulders in a truck accident wh,; 
driving as an employee of Veyo Concrete Products, Inc., of v~)·c, 
Utah. The Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on February 7, 1983, holding, among 
other things, that State Insurance Fund was liable for all medi~l 
and temporary total disability compensation payments. (R, 215-216) 
Defendant State Insurance Fund filed a Motion for Review 
on February 23, 1983, requesting that the Order be amended to 
hold that there should be a reimbursement from Second Injuri· 
Fund to State Insurance Fund of 7/13ths of amounts paid on temporary 
total and medical compensation. Applicant Paulus also submittec 
a Motion for Review on February 25, 1983, arguing other issues. 
On May 17, 1983, the Industrial Commission issued' 
Denial of Motions for Review, in which it upheld the Administrati'1e 
Law Judge's Order. (R, 235-236) 
Writ of Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court 
on June 17, 1983. Appellants now submit their brief in this 
matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Applicants request that the Order of the Commissioi 
be reversed and remanded. The Commission should be instructed 
to order Second Injury Fund to make reimbursement to State Insurance 
Fund on the basis of a 7/13 proportion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic facts in this case are not in dispute d·'' 
2 
be (ecounted briefly. Frederick J. Paulus was injured on 
p,, 11 ust 12, 1978, when the truck that he was driving blew a left 
frr.nt tire. The truck rolled onto the median, and Mr. Paulus 
~ 5 thrown through the windshield and pinned under the back axle. 
The accident occurred on I-15 in southern Nevada. At the time, 
Mr. Pa u 1 us was an employee of Ve yo Concrete Products, Inc., of 
Veyo, Utah. (R, 12-13) 
Mr. Paulus apparently sustained several injuries including 
a laceration on the right side of his forehead, back injury, 
and injury to both shoulders. (R, 3) Applicant Paulus underwent 
surgery in Cedar City for his left shoulder in November of 1978. 
The surgery was performed by Ross McNaught, M.D. Mr. Paulus 
underwent a similar surgical procedure on the right shoulder 
on February 5, 1979. On March 26, 1979, the left shoulder was 
repaired a second time. In October of 1979, Mr. Paulus had further 
problems with his left shoulder; and Dr. McNaught performed further 
surgery on the left shoulder in November of 1979. 
210-21i) 
(R, 194-195; 
On September 11, 1980, applicant Paulus signed a Statement 
and Request settlement with State Insurance Fund, receiving a 
rating of 4% permanent partial impairment of the whole man for 
his shoulders. (R, 9) 
In December 1980, Mr. Paulus went to work as a truck 
driver for a Mr:. Jim Andrus. In March, 1981, during this employment, 
Mr, Paul us was on his trucking job for Andrus at Los Angeles 
~en his back went out. He was bent over and could not straighten 
3 
up. His partner had to drive the truck back to St. Georcf 
Mr. Paulus described the pain as being in approximately the 
place as the pain he had had in his back when he first hur:_ 
back in the truck accident of August 12, 1978. After some physi: 
therapy, Mr. Paulus returned to work in about two or three week3. 
(R, 51-57, 211) 
In July, 1981, while still working for Andrus, Mr. PauL 
reinjured his back while unloading 55-gallon drums in Salt La(, 
City. He was examined by Dr. Mortenson, a neurosurgeon in Ceda: 
City, and again put on physical therapy. Mr. Paulson again returne: 
to work after about three weeks. (R, 58-61, 211-212) 
A hearing on the matter was held in St. George on Septembe: 
20, 1982, before an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrn 
Commission. The medical questions were referred to a med1n: 
panel for evaluation. (R, 184-188) The findings of the medica 
panel were adopted by the Administrative Law Judge as his cwr 
in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, issuec 
February 7, 1983. (R, 210-216) The conclusions of the medica. 
panel are set out in full in the Appendix I, attached herecc. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND IS ENTITLED 
TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM SECOND INJURY FUND 
FOR 7/13THS OF AMOUNTS PAID, UNDER SECTION 
35-1-69 U.C.A., BECAUSE APPLICANT'S PERMANENT 
PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT RESULTING FROM HIS INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN IT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN BUT FOR HIS PRE-EXISTING 
INCAPACITY. 
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Section 35-1-69, U.C.A., was amended in 1981; but it 
15 t.t1e pre-1981 version of this Section which applies in the 
nre.sPnt case as the accident in the course of Mr. Paulus' employment 
occurred in August of 1978. U.S.F. & G. v. Industrial Commission, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 764, 768 (1983). At the time of applicant Paulus's 
August 1978 injuries, Section 35-1-69, U,C,A. (1953, as amended), 
read in pertinent part: 
(1) if any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an 
industrial injury for which compensation 
and medical care is provided by this title 
that results in permanent incapacity which 
is substantially greater than he would haye 
incur red had he not had the pre-existing 
incapacity, compensation and medical care, 
which medical care and other related items 
are outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be 
awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, 
but the liability for the employer for such 
compensation and medical care shall be for 
the industrial injury only and the remainder 
shall be paid out of the special fund provided 
for Section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referred 
to as the "special fund" (emphasis added) 
(The entire pre-1981 amendment Section is 
attached hereto as Appendix II) 
In dispute is the meaning and application of the phrase underlined 
'lbove. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had occassion to review 
the pre-1981 version of this provision a number of times. ~ 
Y... United States Steel Corp., Utah, 551 P.2d 504 (1976); Intermountain 
!Leo.1th Care Inc., y. Ortega, Utah, 562 P,2d 617 (1977); ~ 
Y.._lndustrial Commission, Utah, 604 P.2d 478 (1979); and Intermountain 
3J11titing Cor9. y. Capitano, Utah, 610 P.2d 334 (1980). 
The Utah Supreme Court clarified this provision in 
5 
Internountain Healthcare. Inc. v. Ortega, supra, In that case 
the claimant had a pre-existing psychological condition relatiw: 
to pain in her back. The Commission found that the claimo,: 
had a permanent partial disability of 30%, 10% attributable t: 
her pre-existing psychological condition and 20% attributable 
to an accident which occured while on the job. The Commission, 
failed however, to require the Second Injury Fund to pay its 
proportionate share of medical expenses and the temporary total 
disability compensation. The Utah Supreme Court held that Section 
35-1-69 required the Second Injury Fund to pay l/3rd of the medical 
expenses and temporary total disability compensation, because 
l/3rd of the employee's permanent partial disability was attributable 
to her pre-existing condition. In coming to this decision, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The requirement that the pre-existing condition 
combines with the later injury to cause a 
"substantially greater" permanent incapacity 
does not mean that the former must be greater 
than the later. It simply means that it 
be some definite and measurable portion of 
the causation of the disability. It surely 
cannot be doubted that 30% is substantially 
greater than 20%, nor that 10% disability 
is itself substantial in that it is definite 
and measurable. Consequently, inasmuch as 
it appears that the pre-existing condition 
increased the resulting disability by one-third, 
it follows that under the requirements of 
the statute, the medical expenses as well 
as the compensation award should have been 
apportioned two-thirds from the employer 
and one-third from the special fund. (emphasis 
added) 562 P.2d at 619. 
The ~ decision has not been overruled or modified 
since, so the above-quoted standard must be viewed as a ·iali•.i 
6 
'"te•~retation of Section 35-1-69. 
In the present case, the Administrative Law Judge adopted 
111 e f 1 nd i ngs of the medical panel. The medical panel concluded 
c;,,it_ ~ppl icant Paul us Is total physical impairment from all causes 
was 13%; 7 of the 13% was due to pre-existing causes, which consisted 
of a left knee impairment of 2% and a low-back impairment of 
5%. Thus, under the Ortega standard, Mr. Paulus's permanent 
incapacity is "substantially greater than he would have incurred 
if be had not had the pre-existing incapacity." In the language 
of ~. it surely cannot be doubted that 13% is substantially 
greater than 6% (that attributable to the industrial accident) 
nor that a 7% disability (that attributable to pre-existing condition) 
is itself substantial in that it is definite and measurable. 
Consequently, inasmuch as it appears that the pre-existing condition 
increased the resulting incapacity by 7/13, it follows that under 
the requirement of the statute, the medical expenses as well 
as the temporary total compensation award should be apportioned 
6/13ths from the employer and 7/13ths from Second Injury Fund. 
The standard announced and applied in ~. is a 
simple additive analysis of the "substantially-greater requirement," 
rather than a causal analysis. That is, under ~. it is 
immaterial whether the pre-existing condition ~ the permanent 
incapacity resulting from the industrial injury to be greater 
lhan it otherwise would be. Under Ortega, it is enough that 
'he pre-existing incapacity adds to the permanent incapacity 
resulting from the industrial injury, so that the employee's 
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total permanent partial incapacity is significantly greater. 
This analysis was recently confirmed in Kincheloe y.~: 
Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, Utah, 656 P.2d 440 (1982). In KincbeJ~, 
the Administrative Law Judge held that Second Injury Fund hau 
no application. One of the Judge's reasons was that the claimant's 
1980 industrial injury was "unrelated" to his prior incapacity 
from an injury in 1974. Commenting on this point, the Utah Suprer,
1
e 
Court stated: 
Under the reasoning of Cai;:>itano, the 
fact that the 1980 injury is unrelated to 
the 1974 injury is not dispositive. Irresi;:>ectiye 
of any causal connection, the Second Injury 
Fund is to compensate one who sustains "permanent 
incapacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not 
had the pre-existing incapacity." 656 P.2d 
at 442 (note dropped, emphasis added). 
This arrangement was later limited by the 1981 amendment 
to Section 35-1-69. Under part (b) of the second paragraph (added 
in the 1981 amendment) awards for combined injuries where there 
is no aggravation between the pre-existing condition and the 
industrial injury a percentage-impairment threshold was added. 
This provision, of course, does not apply to the present case, 
since the applicant's industrial injury occurred before the effective 
date of the 1981 amendment. 
The analysis of Section 35-1-69 urged by appellants 
was also confirmed in White y. Industrial Commission, Utah, 604 
P.2d 478 (1979). In ill:l.i.ll, the Court consolidated three cases, 
each of which depended upon judicial construction of Sectiur. 
35-1-69. In each of the consolidated cases, the employee hac 
8 
', 1 ,1nificant physical incapacity before he or she sustained the 
1 ,,Justrial injury. In two of the cases 50% of the applicant's 
errnanent partial impairment was attributable to pre-existing 
•nditions, the other half attributable to the industrial injury. 
In the third case, 75% of the total physical impairment of the 
applicant was attributable to the previously existing impairments 
and 25% was attributed to the industrial accident. In reviewing 
all three cases, the Utah Supreme Court merely noted the percentage 
amounts of pre-existing condition and impairments attributable 
to the industrial injuries. It did not discuss the nature of 
any of the injuries involved in any of the three cases nor did 
it discuss any possible causal relationships between pre-existing 
conditions and the later industrial injuries. Thus, looking 
only at the percentage amounts of pre-existing impairment and 
percentage amounts from the industrial injuries, the Supreme 
Court held that the Second Injury Fund was required to reimburse 
the insurance carrier for the proportion of medical expenses 
and temporary total disability compensation equal to the percentage 
of permanent partial disability applicable to the pre-existing 
iniuries. 
In the 1980 case of Intermountain Smelting Corp. y. 
Caritano, Utah, 610 P.2d 334, appellants' interpretation of Section 
35-1-69 was again confirmed. In that case a construction worker 
severly injured his right ankle. The Commission adopted findings 
that the claimant had a 25% permanent partial disability, 16 
I 12% attributable to a pre-existing injury to his left leg from 
9 
being shot in the service in Korea and 8 1/2% attributable to 
the industrial injury. In Cagitano, the special fund (now Seco
11
,, 
Injury Fund) urged that it should not be required to bear at1, 
of the expenses, inasmuch as the claimant's pre-existing condit
1011 
had nothing to do with the industrial injury. The Court expressly 
addressed this argument, first quoting Section 35-1-69 itself. 
The Court acknowledged that the interpretation offered by the 
special fund was "not entirely without logic and plausability", 
but noted that it is the Court's responsibility to interpret 
and apply the statute as it is written in accordance with its 
purpose. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the employer 
is responsible only for the percentage of compensation and medical 
care which the injury occuring in his employment bears to the 
applicant's total disability, the remainder to be paid out or 
reimbursed by the special fund. 610 P.2d at 336-337. 
In support of his holding in his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Order, of February 7, 1983, the Administrative 
Law Judge cited the recent case of U.S.F. & G. v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 657 P.2d 764 (1983). (R, 215) A review of 
this case, however, does not appear to offer any guidance one 
way or the other as to the proper interpretation and application 
of the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69. F i rs t , the case 
comes in 1983 and considers Section 35-1-69 in its post-19 81 
amendment version. Second, insofar as it discusses Section 35-1-69 
at all, the case merely restates the statute itself. The Courr 
states: 
10 
Explicit ~tatutory authority exists to apportion 
compensation awards and medical costs between 
employers and the Second Injury Fund, provided 
pertinent co~ditions are met. Basically, 
those conditions are three in number: 1) 
permanent incapacity occassioned by accidental 
injury, disease or congential causes, followed 
by 2) subsequent injury resulting in further 
permanent incapacity which is 3) substantially 
greater than that which would have been incurred 
if there had been no pre-existing incapacity. 
657 P.2d at 767. 
This passage simply does not help determine the issue in the 
present case. 
To summarize, the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69, 
as interpreted by the relevant case law, clearly supports appellants' 
contention that State Insurance Fund is entitled to reimbursement 
from Second Injury Fund for a portion of medical expenses and 
compensation based on the ratio of applicant Paulus's pre- existing 
impairment to the impairment he sustained in his industrial injury, 
in this case 7/13. The recent case cited by the Administrative 
~w Judge in his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
does not indicate anything to the contrary, nor does it support 
the Commission's holding. 
POINT II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S REASONING 
THAT ONE OF APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING 
CONDITIONS PROVIDED NO BASIS FOR SECOND INJURY 
FUND AWARD WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROPER 
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 35-1-69. 
In his Order, the Administrative Law Judge took the 
view that all of Mr. Paulus's back problems ei"ther pre-existed 
his 1978 accident, or were the result of a natural, progressive 
aegenerative condition. The Administrative Law Judge also adopted 
11 
the finding of the medical panel that there was no connection 
between Mr. Paulus's lower back problems and his industrial accident: 
1. There is not a medically demonstrable 
causal connection between the low back problem 
complained of and the industrial accident. 
This man has had back symptoms as far back 
as 1975 and has had intermitent back symptoms 
since that time that in general have been 
progressively increasing. There is no evidence 
that any of the three accidents of 8-12-78, 
March 1981 or July 1981, have had any demon-
strable lasting effect on his back condition. 
(R, 212) 
It was with these adopted facts that the Administrative Law Judge 
offered one reason for not requiring the Second Injury Fund to 
participate in payment of medical expenses and compensation. 
His reasoning is as follows: 
As to the 5% impairment to the back existing 
before August 1978, we have a more difficult 
question. The Administrative Law Judge finds 
that the applicant cannot recover from the 
Second Injury Fund for the 5% impairment 
of the back as it existed prior to the August 
1978 injury for three reasons: 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
2. The second reason is simply that there 
can be no Second Injury Fund award since 
there is no new industrial injury or even 
a basis for an industrial award. 
(R, 215) 
The Administrative Law Judge's reasoning here apparentiJ 
refers to Mr. Paulus's 5% permanent partial impairment from his 
pre-existing back condition. The fact that his industrial iniurr 
did not reinjure or aggravate his pre-existing back conditior, 
is irrelevant. As argued under Point I, no medical causal connection 
between the industrial injury and pre-existing conditions neeJ 
12 
exist in order for Second Injury Fund to be liable for a portion 
<>f medical expenses and compensation. Following the~ standard, 
Mr. Paulus's pre-existing back condition was rateable at 5% and 
thus v;as a "definite and measurable portion of the causation 
ur the disability" and most certainly even unrelated physical 
impairments can and do have an effect on an individual's overall 
employability that is the very thing that Second Injury Funds 
are designed to protect. 
POINT III 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ERRED IN MAINTAINING 
THAT ONE OF APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS 
WAS NOT REALLY A PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT. 
In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
the Administrative Law Judge stated: 
2. The second reason is simply that there 
can be no Second Injury Fund award since 
there is no new industrial injury or even 
a basis for an industrial award. 1'.h2..l.l.gh 
the panel found that the applicant had a 
2% increase in impairment. this was not in 
reality a permanent increase since it could 
be corrected by minor surgery. (R, 215, 
emphasis added) 
The Judge's statement concerning a 2% increase in impairment 
apparently refers to the 2% impairment of the left knee pre-existing 
the August 1978 accident. Whether this impairment is permanent 
or could be corrected by minor surgery, as asserted by the Admini-
strative Law Judge, is not stated in the medical panel report. 
(R, 194-203) There is no evidence upon which the Commission 
could base such an opinion. The conclusion of the medical panel 
in this regard is found under the question asking about permanent 
13 
impairment and is answered as follows: 
(5) b. There is a minor calcification of 
the proximal end of the medial collateral 
ligament of the left knee at its proximal 
end over the medial femoral condyle indicitive 
of "Pelligrini-Stieda calcification of the 
left medial collateral ligament" related 
to his 1975 accident. This represents 5% 
impairment of the extremity or 2% impairment 
of the body. (R, 213-214) 
The Administrative Law Judge simply erred on this point, 
The Judge's statement is purely speculative and not supported 
by any evidence in the case. The medical panel would not have 
rated it as a permanent impairment if it was not permaner.t, 
In the absence of conflicting medical evidence, the trier cf 
fact cannot dis regard the evidence of the Commission- appointed 
panel. In the present case, Mr. Paul us' s knee condition resulted 
from a glider crash in 1975. (R, 199) 
It should be noted that at point ( 9) in the medica: 
panel report as adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, the 
medical panel rates Mr. Paulus's left shoulder at 4% permanent 
partial impairment but, at the same time, advises that future 
surgery might well be expected to reduce this impairment by 21. 
In that instance, the Administrative Law Judge did have a conclusion 
of the medical panel that future medical procedure could reduce 
the percentage of impairment. Nevertheless, the Administrative 
Law Judge in his Order, accepts the left shoulder impairrnen'. 
as a 4% permanent partial impairment. 
Even if the Commission was correct in its analysis 
of the 2% left knee impairment, there still remains the 5% permanent 
14 
partial impairment of the lower back, which existed prior to 
1~1,e accident of August of 1978. Mr. Paulus's total physical 
1 mpairrnent from all causes would then be 11%, instead of 13%, 
with 6% due to the accident and 5% due to the pre-existing low 
b-id condition. In that case, State Insurance Fund should be 
reimbursed by the Second Injury Fund on the basis of the fraction 
5/11. That is to say, the Second Injury Fund should reimburse 
state Insurance Fund for 5/llths of the temporary total compensation 
and medical costs. 
POINT IV 
THE STATEMENT AND REQUEST AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
APPLICANT AND THE STATE INSURANCE FUND DOES 
NOT CUT OUT THE APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING 
PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT RATING, AS IMPLIED 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THEREFORE 
CANNOT BE A BAR TO THE REIMBURSEMENT ENTITLEMENT 
OF THE STATE INSURANCE FUND. 
The first reason the Administrative Law Judge gave 
in his Order for not apportioning the liability for benefits 
concerns the Statement-and-Request Settlement form signed between 
the State Insurance Fund and the applicant. The Judge argues 
as follows: 
As to the 5% impairment to the back 
existing before August 1978, we have a more 
difficult question. The Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the applicant cannot recover 
from the Second Injury Fund for the 5% impairment 
of the back as it existed prior to the August 
1978 injury for three reasons: 
l. That the Statement and Request 
was agreed to and signed, allowing the applicant 
a 4% permanent partial impairment rating 
following the 1978 incident. This agreement 
becomes a full accord and satisfaction binding 
on the applicant as to all claims prior to 
15 
the signing of that document and acceptance 
of the 4% benefits. It cannot be called 
res judicata because the Commission did not 
enter an Order, however, the accord and satis-
faction forecloses the applicant from re-
negotiating the benefits he was entitled 
to at that time at some later date much the 
same as res adjudicata. (R, 215) 
The Administrative Law Judge implies by this argument 
that the permanent partial impairment rating of 4%, to which 
Mr. Paulus agreed, included any and all permanent partial impairment, 
that existed prior to the August 1978 industrial injury, in particular 
the 5% pre-existing back injury. The Statement and Request agreement 
cannot be so construed, however. 
Such settlement agreements must be narrowly construed 
to cover only those claims or rights specifically mentioned. 
Professor A. Larson states: 
Section 82.51 General rule: only s~ecifically 
mentioned claims included 
A settlement covers only those claims 
or rights that are specifically mentioned 
in the agreement. Thus claims for a latent 
injury unknown at the time of the settlement, 
or subsequent injuries, or for ~rior injuries 
not covered in the agreement have been held 
not barred by a settlement agreement. Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol 3, Section 
82.51 (footnotes dropped, emphasis added). 
The 4% permanent partial impairment mentioned in tt.e 
Statement and Request refers only to the condition of Mr. Paulus' 3 
shoulders. This is recognized by the Administrative Law Judge ' 
at the hearing: 
The Court: The signature was he signed away 
a Statement of Request for a 4% permanent 
partial impairment of his shoulders. 
Mr. Julien: That's correct. (R, 27) 
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rt is also quite clear from the wording in the statement and 
R~guest: 
• for a permanent partial impairment 
4% of the whole man as rated by Dr. Ross 
McNaught, M.D. {R, 9) 
The record discloses that the rating made by Dr. McNaught, as 
of the date of the settlement agreement {September 4, 1980), 
was the rating he gave Mr. Paulus in a letter of June 30, 1980. 
It is clear from Dr. McNaught's discussion in his letter that 
he is referring only to Mr. Paulus's shoulders when he makes 
the 4% rating. Referring to the shoulders, Dr. McNaught writes: 
There is some residual stiffness which certainly 
may improve with time, but at present it 
is about a 6% upper extremity impairment, 
or a 4% whole man impairment. {R, 83) 
Given all this, it would be perverse to believe that 
Mr. Paulus thought he was agreeing to a rating including ~ 
and all of his physical impairments and not just his shoulders. 
Since the Statement and Request agreement refers only 
to the shoulder condition of Mr. Paulus, it does not concern 
the ratings for Mr. Paulus's pre-exisiting conditions. Mr. Paulus 
did not sign away any permanent partial impairment rating for 
pre-existing conditions; and since he did have a pre-existing 
irn~airment, the Second Injury Fund becomes liable for its propor-
tionate share of Mr. Paulus's temporary total compensation benefits 
and medical expenses under Section 35-1-69. 
As found by the medical panel, the rating for pre-existing 
impairment is 7%, 5% for low back condition and 2% for left knee 
,:ondition. {R, 202) In his Order, the Administrative Law Judge 
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adopted the findings of the medical panel that Mr. Paulus's total 
physical impairment from all causes was 13%. For this reasor,, 
appellants contend that 7/13 is the proper proportion of reimburse 
ment it should receive from Second Injury Fund. 
If the 4% mentioned in the Statement and Request were 
adopted to rate Mr. Paul us' s shoulder condition, then his total 
impairment rating would be 11%. Combining this with the rating 
for pre-exisi ting impairment, the fr action would then be 7 /11--meaning 
that Second Injury Fund would be liable for a larger portion. 
Whether the proper portion of reimbursement by Second 
Injury Fund to State Insurance Fund should be 7/13 or 7/11, it 
is perfectly clear that Mr. Paul us did not sign away any claims 
based on pre-existing impairment and that, therefore, Seconc 
Injury Fund is liable for reimbursement to State Insurance Fund. 
POINT V 
THE FACT THAT SECOND INJURY FUND WAS NOT 
A PARTY TO THE STATEMENT AND REQUEST AGREEMENT 
DOES NOT RELEASE IT FROM LIABILITY BASED 
ON APPLICANT'S PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS. 
In the recent case of Rhodes Pump Sales y. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, No. 19163, filed April 26, 1984, the Supreme 
Court held that the State Insurance Fund was entitled to an apportion-
ment between it and the Second Injury Fund for medical expenses 
and temporary total disability benefits it had paid to the claimant. 
The Court held Second Injury Fund liable, even though a settlemer.t 
agreement had been signed which made no mention of any pre-existing 
condition and to which Second Injury Fund was not a party. The 
Court's reason for so holding was in part that the parties were 
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unaware of the pre-existing condition at the time of the settlement 
agreement. 
The present case is similar in that the State Insurance 
Fund did not know of any pre-existing conditions at the time 
the Statement and Request was signed. It was for this reason 
that no pre-existing conditions were referred to in the Statement 
and Request (See Point IV); and it was also for this reason that 
Second Injury Fund was not made a party to the Statement and 
Request settlement agreement. 
As set out in the Statement of Facts, above, the Statement 
and Request was signed ~ Mr. Paulus had aggravated his back 
problems in March and April, 1981, while working for Mr. Andrus. 
More importantly, the record reveals that no mention was anywhere 
made of a pre-existing back condition prior to the Statement 
and Request settlement agreement of September 11, 1980. In his 
letter of November 11, 1978, Dr. McNaught notes "some type of 
back injury" from the accident; but he does not mention any pre-
existing back condition. (R, 3) Neither is any pre-existing 
condition mentioned in his letter of June 30, 1980. (R, 11) 
There is no reference to any pre-existing condition in the early 
hospital and medical reports. (R, 5-6) No mention of a pre-
existing condition is made on the Employee's Statement of September 
18, 1978; and the shoulder condition is the only problem noted 
on Mr. Paulus's Application for a Hearing of February 2, 1979. 
IR, 8, 12) According to Mr. Paulus's testimony at the hearing 
c,f September 20, 1982, he did not receive any treatment for his 
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low back from the time of his accident until January 30, 1981 . 
(R, 71-72) In fact, the subject of pre-existing conditions actual!. 
did not come to the attention of the State Insurance Fund unt, 
after the hearing of September 20, 1982--well after the State 11 ,,,. 
and Request settlement agreement. 
After the hearing, State Insurance Fund acquired additior.a. 
medical records that indicated Mr. Paulus had pre-existing bac• 
problems. At the hearing, additional medical doctors were fLst 
brought to the attention of the parties other than Mr. Paulus. 
Counsel for the State Insurance Fund immediately after receipt 
submitted those records to the Administrative Law Judge; and 
the additional records were forwarded to the medical panel. 
(R, 189-191) These medical records are at pages 136-144 and 151-1;5 
of the present Record. 1 
In view of the above recounted facts and the Suprerr.e 
Court holding in Rhodes Pump Sales, supra, the Second Iniur)' 
Fund should not be released from liability for apportionment 
with State Insurance Fund on the basis of the Statement and Request 
settlement agreement in this case. The Rhodes Pump Sales case 
is dispositive of that issue without further argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69, U.C.A., 
and the supporting case law, the Utah State Insurance Fund is 
entitled to reimbursement from Second Injury Fund for 7/lJths 
1The table of contents to the Supreme Court Record mistaken:: 
indicates that these medical records were part of the Exh1b~t" 
D-1 through D-6, submitted at the hearing of September 20, 19S,. 
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" ;imounts paid to applicant Paulus for medical expenses and 
tf"'flC'tary total compensation benefits. None of the reasons mentioned 
, 1 the Administrative Law Judge in his Order of February 7, 1983, 
0 r1ect this conclusion. Although the Administrative Law Judge 
.·,plied that Mr. Paulus's pre-existing back condition would have 
ru aggravate or be aggravated by his industrial injury in order 
tu receive any Second Injury Fund award, the question of aggravation 
is irrelevant under the pre-1981 version of Section 35-1-69. 
Although the Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Paulus's 
knee condition as not really a permanent impairment, this was 
error because the only medical evidence in the record is to the 
contrary. 
Finally, although the Administrative Law Judge refers 
to the Statement and Request agreement, that agreement does not 
at all affect Second Injury Fund's liability for reimbursing 
State Insurance Fund. First, the agreement itself does not refer 
to any pre-existing impairments and thus, applicant Paulus and 
tne State Insurance Fund cannot be understood to have signed 
away any permanent partial impairment rating for pre-existing 
conditions. Second, the fact that Second Injury Fund was not 
;:arty to the Statement and Request agreement cannot release it 
from liability in this case, because State Insurance Fund was 
unaware of any pre-existing conditions at the time of the agreement. 
Accordingly, it must be concluded that the Second Injury Fund 
<s liable for reimbursement to the State Insurance Fund on the 
basis of applicant's pre-existing impairments and that the proper 
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fraction for the apportionment is 7/13 in this case. 
DATED THIS ~~~Day of May, 1984. 
BLACK & MOORE 
"~Ml &M a:Es R. BACK 
CE FICATE MAILING 
I hereby certify ~,M,t a true and correct copy of t~." 
foregoing BRIEF was sent this -ft!i!LDay of May, 1984, to the followw 
Mr. Stephen W. Julien 
Attorney for Applicant 
P.O. Box 1538 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Frank V. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Industrial 
Commission of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Gilbert Martinez 
Second Injury Fund 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX # I 
Paye 
Re: 
0 (j u ) 'J '· iJ r1 in~ 
Frederick J. Paulus 
lated to the episode of July 1981. 
9 
(5) a. There is permanent physical impairment attrib-
utciLle to progressive degenerative lumbar spine disorder 
which appears to be gradually progressive over a period 
of time from 1975 and currently the equivalent of 10% 
permanent physical impairment of the body as a whole. 
S% (or 1/2) was present previous to 8-12-78. The other 
5% (or 1/2) has been due to natural progression of his 
a~generative disc disease since B-12-78 and not a result 
of the episodes at work relating to his back. 
b. There is a minor calcification of the proximal 
end of the medial collateral ligament of the left knee 
at its proximal end over the medial femoral condyle in-
dicative of "Pelligrini-Stieda calcification of the 
left medial collateral ligament" related to his 1975 
accident. This represents 5% impairment of the extrem-
ity or 2% impairment of the body. 
(6) Applicant's total physical impairment if any re-
sulting from all causes and conditions is as follows: 
Right shoulder 2% due to this accident 
Left shoulder 4% due to this accident 
Left knee 2% due to accident of 19 75 
Low back 5% 2rior to accident of 8-12-78 
Total 13% Combined 13% 
In this case the combined is the same value as the total 
of the numbers. 
(7) There has been 5% additional permanent physical im-
pairment of the low back from gradual progressive dis-
order of the lumbar spine since the industrial injury. 
( 8) The surgeries and medical procedures performed were 
necessitated by the applicant's industrial accident. 
(9) The applicant would well be served by excision of 
the outer end of the left clavicle which would be expect-
ed to reduce his permanent physical impairment by 2% and 
would result in a moderate losttime of 4 to 8 weeks de-
pending upon his activies. At some future time he may 
require the same p•ocedure on the right shoulder. If 
such a procedure is.performed on the right shoulder i 
would not reduce the permanent impairment below the p 
send rating of 2%. 
No additional medical treatment or medication appears 
Le reasonably required in treating the applicant's pro-
blems from the industrial injury. 
(10) I believe that this questions has received a com-
prehensive answer in the above. If there remains any 
~-·~~~~~~~~~-:-:-~:---::-:--~-:-:::---;---:----:-~-:-".""."'""""."'."~~~--------.... u l) u .. :.: ,j - ') 0 
Page ten 
Re: Frederick J. Paulus 
question please contact this examiner. 
Very sincerely, 
') 
B/f zc:!:2::!0:1 
BGH:hh 
APPENDIX ti II 
35-1-GD. Combined injuries resulting in permanent incapacity-Ba.sis 
of compensation-Special ftind-Trainin:; of employee.-( I) Jf u11y ern-
pl"j 1:c w)10 )1;\::i J!t't'\l1 1thly 11u·11ricd a pcri11n11c11t incapa<'ity by ac.:t.'.idcntal 
111Jury, di:-.case, or corigc111tal causes, sustains au industrial injury for which 
1_·q111pen~ation and 111ed1(';d C'are io:; provided by this title that results in 
p1'r111auent iucapacJty w·hicli is substantially greater than he would have 
1n\'11rred 1f he l1;1d 11ot !1:id tl1r pri.:-cxisting incap;:icity, compensation and 
medical tare, which medical eare an<l other related items are outlined in 
:-.edJOu :Jj-1-1'1, shalt be a\\-ardc<l 011 the basis of the con1bi11cd injuries, but 
the liabil1ty of the crnploycr for such to111pc11sation and 111c<lical care shall 
Le fur !l1c i11dui.,t1 ial 111j11r y u1ily and tl1c I"t'!ll1ti11dcr sludl Le p<1id out of tho 
special fllnd provideU for i11 scctiou JG-I-G8 ( l) hcrri11afler rcl"crrcd to us 
l!1c "~pecinl funJ." 
A 1ncLlicnl pnncl liuriug the q11nliticntioJ1.s of tlrn mcJicnl pnnel set 
forth iu !lectiou :J::J-'.!-CiG, shall rcric\v all n1eLlical a~pcds of tlie case aml 
deterwine first, the total pcrmauent physical i111pa1r111cut resulting from 
all causes anLl conditions wcluding the industrial injury; sccoud, the per-
centage of permanent physical impairwcnt attriLutablc to the iuclustrial 
11tJury; n11J tl11nl, t!1c percentage of pcn11u11ct1t pl1y:->1cal impairiucnt at-
tr1LutuLlc to previously existing conditioH.~ whether Jue to accidental 
111Jury, Ji~ca<.,c ur cur1~enital causes. 'l'lie iuJustrial cornn1i.s~io11 sl111ll tlie11 
assess the linLility for compensation llll<l medical cnrc to the employer 011 
the Lasis of the pcrecutagc of permanent physical impa1rznent attributable 
to Lite wdustnal inJury only and the rernainder shall he payable out of 
the ~aid :,pecial fu11d. A111ouuis, if any, which have Lcca paid by the em-
ployer in excess of tlic portion attributable to the said industrial injury 
shnll be relwburseJ to-tlie e!llploycr out of said spcc.:ial fund. 
(2) ln adJitio11 the commission in its discretion H1ay increase the 
weekly cu111pcn~atw11 rale~ Lo Le puiJ out of .sw.:J1 spct:ial furn.I, ouch iu-
crcase to Le u~cJ for the rchabililation and training uf auy employeo 
coinrng witl11u the proYi~ious of tliis chapter as uiay be certified to the 
commission by t!ie rehabilitation department of the state Loard of education 
as Lerng clig1blc for ~·eliabilitation and training i proviJeJ, however, that 
in no case shall there be paid out of such special fund for rehabilitation 
au auiouut in excess of $1,000. 
